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Abstract—The Internet of things (IoT) will make it possible
to interconnect and simultaneously control distributed elec-
trical loads. Various technical and regulatory concerns have
been raised that IoT-operated loads are being deployed with-
out appropriately considering and systematically addressing
potential cyber-security challenges. Hence, one can envision
a hypothetical scenario when an ensemble of IoT-controlled
loads can be hacked with malicious intentions of compromising
operations of the electrical grid. Under this scenario, the
attacker would use geographically distributed IoT-controlled
loads to alternate their net power injections into the electrical
grid in such a way that may disrupt normal grid operations.
This paper presents a modeling framework to analyze grid
impacts of distributed cyber-attacks on IoT-controlled loads.
This framework is used to demonstrate how a hypothetical
distributed cyber-attack propagates from the distribution
electrical grid, where IoT-controlled loads are expected to
be installed, to the transmission electrical grid. The techno-
economic interactions between the distribution and transmis-
sion electrical grids are accounted for by means of bilevel
optimization. The case study is carried out on the modified
versions of the 3-area IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) and
the IEEE 13-bus distribution feeder. Our numerical results
demonstrate that the severity of such attacks depends on the
penetration level of IoT-controlled loads and the strategy of
the attacker.
Keywords—Cyber-security, distributed cyber-atacks, internet-
of-things, smart appliances, smart grid, transmission and distri-
bution integration.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets and Indices
BT/D Set of buses in the transmission/distribution
grid, indexed by b.
BD, ↓b Set of buses in the distribution grid located
downstream of bus b.
B+ Set of buses in the transmission grid that are
root buses for distribution grids, indexed by b.
IT/D(IT/Db ) Set of generation resources located in the
transmission/distribution grid (located at bus
b), indexed by i.
LT/D Set of lines in the transmission/distribution
grid, indexed by l.
VA Set of decision variables of the attacker.
VT/D Set of decision variables made for the trans-
mission/distribution grid.
VTD Set of dual decision variables for the transmis-
sion grid.
b0 Index of the root bus in the distribution grid.
o(l)/r(l) Indices of sending/receiving buses of line l.
B. Parameters
Bl Susceptance of line l.
CBb Price bid of demand at bus b.
COi Price offer of generation resource i.
F l Active power flow limit in line l.
G
p
i/G
p
i Upper/lower limits on the active power output
of generator i.
G
q
i/G
q
i Upper/lower limits on the reactive power out-
put of generator i.
Gl Conductance of line l.
Lp/qb Active/reactive power load at bus b.
P b Upper limit on the active power transfer be-
tween the transmission and distribution grids
at bus b of the transmission grid.
Rl Resistance of line l.
T Tariff in the distribution grid.
Sl Apparent power flow limit in line l.
V i/V i Current magnitude squared in line l of the
distribution grid.
Xl Reactance of line l.
Γ Attack severity parameter.
∆
p
,∆p Upper/lower limits on the net active power
injection of IoT-controlled loads.
∆
q
,∆q Upper/lower limits on the net reactive power
injection of IoT-controlled loads.
ωlb Power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) of
line l from injection at bus b.
C. Variables
al Current magnitude squared in line l of the dis-
tribution grid.
f p/ql Active/reactive power flow in line l.
gp/qi Active/reactive power output of generation re-
source i.
oA,T/D Objective function of the attacker in the trans-
mission/distribution grid.
oT/D Objective function of transmission/distribution
grid.
oTD Dual objective function of the transmission grid
pB/Ob Active power bid/offered by the distribution
utility at bus b the wholesale electricity market.
vb Voltage magnitude squared at bus b.
∆f p/ql Active/reactive power flow adjustment in line l
due to attacker’s injection ∆lp/qb .
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∆lp/q Attacker’s modification of the net active/reactive
power injection of IoT-controlled loads at bus b.
θb Voltage angle at bus b.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale deployment of internet-based devices, at
both the customer- and grid-ends, expose electrical grids
to an imminent threat of cyber-attacks. These threats are
much alike to other internet-connected services. Previous
studies have primarily focused on cyber-attacks that directly
compromise power utilities, large generation companies or
individual bulk generators [1], [2]. On the other hand,
distributed cyber-attacks launched from an ensemble of
compromised IoT-controlled loads can be equally perni-
cious. This paper aims to analyze the threats posed by such
distributed cyber-attacks.
The penetration level of IoT-controlled devices in
homes, offices and businesses that are directly connected
to the electrical grid and can be compromised remotely has
been constantly increasing. Compromised IoT devices have
already been used to launch devastating distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks on web services. For instance,
a recent attack on the Dyn, a domain name service (DNS)
provider, caused major internet websites, e.g. Twitter, to
be unavailable for hours [3]. Using specialized malware,
attackers captured myriads of IoT-controlled devices (us-
ing their default passwords) and routed traffic from these
captured devices to the Dyn. The distributed nature of this
attack enabled the attackers to circumvent standard defense
mechanisms (e.g., those that detect a large volume of traffic
from a single IP address).
The scale and impact of the Dyn attack presages similar
attacks on the electrical grid. Specifically, an attacker can
potentially be able to modify the power consumption of
compromised IoT-controlled loads to maliciously cause
load shedding, reduce security margins, or even trigger a
cascading failure. As opposed to conventional cyber-attacks
on the grid that target a relatively small number of power
utilities, large generation companies or individual bulk
generators [1], [2], the distributed cyber-attacks considered
in this paper target a large number of small IoT-connected
loads. Even though these loads can be small-scale and
geographically distributed, potentially across multiple dis-
tribution grids, a single attacker is technically capable of
aggregating these loads and modifying their power con-
sumption in a co-ordinated, centralized manner.
Figure 1 shows the interactions between the electrical
grid and the attacker modeled in this paper. The attacker
devises the optimal attack strategy to maximize damage
to the electrical grid by modifying the active and reactive
power consumption of IoT-controlled loads by ∆lpb and ∆l
q
b,
respectively. These modifications change the power flow in
distribution lines, which in turn change the power flow in
transmission lines. The interactions between the distribution
and transmission grids are modeled by means of bi-level
optimization. This paper models two attack strategies: naive
and insidious. The naive strategy assumes that the attacker
cannot forecast and circumvent the effect of built-in grid
protection mechanisms, e.g. circuit breakers, to maximize
damage, while the insidious strategy accounts for these
effects. Based on the proposed framework, the case study
demonstrates potential grid impacts of such distributed
Fig. 1: Interactions between the attacker and electrical grid.
cyber-attacks.
A. Related Work
Previous studies on cyber-attacks on the electrical grid
have typically focused on centralized attacks in which
an attacker gains access to the supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) system. For example, this attack
mechanism led to the famous stuxnet attack [4]. Distributed
cyber-attacks on the electrical grid have been considered
primarily in the context of false data injection attacks.
For example, this attack mechanism is reported in [5],
[6], where the attacker hijacks and falsely reports phasor
measurement unit (PMU) readings. That is, the attacker
attempts to maliciously change PMU readings and trick the
grid operator into making scheduling and dispatch decisions
that hamper reliability.
A cyber-attack on an relatively large aggregator of
distributed IoT-controlled loads is modeled in [7]. However,
[7] considers the transmission grid only and does not
account for the interactions between the transmission and
distribution grids, where IoT-controlled loads are expected
to be deployed. Compared to [7], this paper studies cyber-
attacks on IoT-controlled loads located in the distribution
grid.
B. Paper Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
1) We describe a bilevel optimization model that
makes it possible to operate the transmission and
distribution electrical grid coordinately.
2) We devise the optimal attack strategy for a naive
and insidious attacker.
3) Using the bi-level optimization model and attack
strategy described above, we analyze the impacts
of distributed cyber-attacks on the distribution and
transmission electrical grid.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the model that makes it possible to operate the
transmission and distribution grids coordinately. Section III
describes the model of the attacker. Section IV describes
the model for analyzing the transmission and distribution
grid operations under the attack. Section V describes the
case study and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. STEADY-STATE GRID OPERATIONS
This section describes the models used for the co-
ordinated operation of the distribution and transmission
electrical grids.
A. Assumptions
The transmission and distribution grid models are de-
veloped under the following assumptions:
1) The proposed transmission and distribution mod-
els are formulated for a single time period, i.e.
inter-temporal and mixed-integer constraints are
neglected.
2) The transmission grid is operated by the trans-
mission system operator (TSO) using a lossless
dc approximation of ac power flow equations that
can accommodate a meshed network topology.
The TSO is responsible for clearing the whole-
sale electricity market, which is assumed to be
perfectly competitive.
3) The distribution grid has a tree network topol-
ogy and is operated by the distribution system
operator (DSO) using an SOCP relaxation of ac
power flow equations, i.e. it explicitly accounts
for active power and reactive power flows, as
well as for voltage limits. The DSO is responsible
for scheduling generation resources located in the
distribution grid, as well as for purchasing and
selling power in the electricity market.
4) The transmission and distribution grids are con-
nected via the single bus. This interface is limited
to the active power exchange of a finite capacity,
i.e. the distribution grid has sufficient internal
resources to compensate its reactive power needs.
B. Distribution Grid
max
VD
oD :=
[∑
b∈BD
LpbT −
∑
i∈IU
COi g
p
i + λb0(p
O
b0 − pBb0)
]
(1)
gpi ≤ G
p
i , ∀i ∈ ID (2)
gpi ≥ Gpi , ∀i ∈ ID (3)
gqi ≤ G
q
i , ∀i ∈ ID (4)
gqi ≥ Gqi , ∀i ∈ ID (5)
(f pl )
2 + (f ql )
2 ≤ S2l , ∀l ∈ LD (6)
(f pl − alRl)2 + (f ql − alXl)2 ≤ S
2
l , ∀l ∈ LD (7)
vr(l) − 2(Rlf pl +Xlf ql ) + al(R2i +X2l ) = vo(l), ∀l ∈ LD
(8)[
(f pl )
2 + (f ql )
2
] 1
al
≤ vo(l), ∀l ∈ LD (9)
f pl|o(l)=b −
∑
l|r(l)=b
(f pl − alRl)−
∑
i∈IDb
gpi + L
p
b + vbGl|o(l)=b
= 0, ∀b ∈ BD\{b0} (10)
f ql|o(l)=b −
∑
l|r(l)=b
(f ql − alXl)−
∑
i∈IDb
gqi + L
q
b − vbBl|o(l)=b
= 0, ∀b ∈ BD\{b0} (11)
−
∑
l|r(l)=b0
(f pl − alRl)−pOb0 + pBb0 + vb0Gl|o(l)=b0 = 0 (12)
−
∑
l|r(l)=b0
(f ql − alXl)− vb0Gl|o(l)=b0 = 0 (13)
pOb0 ≤ P b0 (14)
pBb0 ≤ P b0 (15)
vb ≤ V b, ∀b ∈ BD (16)
vb ≥ V b, ∀b ∈ BD (17)
VD = {al, gpi , gqi , vb ≥ 0; f pl , f ql : free} (18)
Eq. (1) is the objective function of the DSO, which aims
to maximize the gross profit that includes the following
three terms: i) payments collected by the utility from its
customers, ii) operating cost of generation resources located
in the distribution grid, iii) cost of transactions that DSO
performs in the wholesale electricity markets. If pOb0 > 0,
i.e. the DSO sells surplus electricity in the wholesale
electricity market, the third term of the objective function
is positive. Alternatively, if pBb0 < 0, i.e. the DSO purchases
electricity in the wholesale electricity market, the third term
is negative. Note that due to the market regulation, there is a
need to enforce complementarity condition on decisions pBb0
and pOb0 that ensures that the DSO cannot simultaneously
sell and purchase electricity in the wholesale market, i.e.
pBb0p
O
b0 = 0. Eq. (2)-(5) enforce the minimum and maximum
limits on the active and reactive power output of generation
resources located in the distribution grid. Eq. (6)-(7) limit
the apparent power flow in distribution lines, while eq. (8)-
(10) represent a relaxation of ac power flow equations,
[8]. The active and reactive power balance for each bus
is enforced in eq. (10)-(13). Note that eq. (12)-(13) model
the power balance for the root bus of the distribution grid
with no generation resource or load connected to that bus.
The active power exchange between the distribution and
transmission grid is limited in eq. (14)-(15). Eq. (16)-(17)
enforce the maximum and minimum limits on bus voltages.
Eq. (18) declares all decisions variables optimized by the
DSO.
C. Transmission Grid
max
VT
oT :=[ ∑
b∈BT
CBbD
p
b+
∑
b∈BD
CBb p
B
b −
∑
i∈IT
COi g
p
i−
∑
i∈IU
COb p
O
b
]
(19)∑
i∈Ib
gpi +
∑
l|r(l)=b
f pl −
∑
l|o(l)=b
f pl + p
O
b − pBb = Lpb : (λb),
∀b ∈ B+ (20)∑
i∈Ib
gpi +
∑
l|r(l)=b
f pl −
∑
l|o(l)=b
f pl = L
p
b : (λb),
∀b ∈ BT\{B+} (21)
gpi ≤ G
p
i : (αi), ∀i ∈ IT (22)
gpi ≥ Gpi : (αi), ∀i ∈ IT (23)
pOb ≤ P b : (ψb), ∀b ∈ B+ (24)
pBb ≤ P b : (ψb), ∀b ∈ B+ (25)
f pl =
1
Xl
(θo(l) − θr(l)) : (ξl), ∀l ∈ LT (26)
f pl ≤ F l : (δl), ∀l ∈ LT (27)
f pl ≥ −F l : (δl), ∀l ∈ LT (28)
VT = {gpi , f pl , θb: free; pOb , pBb ≥ 0}. (29)
Eq. (19) is the objective function of the TSO, which aims
to maximize the social welfare that includes the following
terms: i) bids of the customers connected to transmission
grid, ii) bids of the DSO, iii) offers of generators connected
to the transmission grid, iv) offers of the DSO. The nodal
active power balance is enforced in eq. (20) for every
bus in the transmission grid connected to the distribution
grid and in eq. (21) for the remaining buses. Eq. (22)-
(23) enforces the maximum and minimum limits on the
active power output of the generation resources located in
the transmission grid. Eq. (24)-(25) limit the active power
purchased or sold by the DSO. The active power flow in
each line of the transmission grid is computed in eq. (26)
and eq. (27)-(28) enforce the active power flow limits.
Primal decision variables of eq. (19)-(28) are declared in
(29), while dual variables are given in line with respective
constraints after a colon.
D. Coordinated DSO-TSO Model
For the DSO model in eq. (1)-(18) and the TSO model
in eq. (19)-(29), we formulate the following model to model
their coordinated operation:
max
VD
oD (30)
D(VD) ≤ 0 (31)
pBb0 , p
O
b0 , λb0 ∈ arg maxVT o
T (32)
T (VT) ≤ 0, (33)
where T (·) and D(·) represent the constraints in eq. (2)-
(17) and (20)-(28), respectively.
III. ATTACKER’S MODEL
A. Assumptions
The following assumptions are made on the attacker:
1) The attacker has perfect knowledge of all compro-
mised IoT-controlled loads, their technical char-
acteristics and placement in the distribution grid.
From the attacker perspective, this assumption
results in the ‘best-case’ attack scenario.
2) The attacker has perfect knowledge of the trans-
mission and distribution topology, including the
power transfer distribution factors (ωlb). In some
cases, this data can be obtained or estimated from
open sources, e.g. [9]. From the grid perspective,
this assumption results in the ‘worst-case’ attack
scenario.
B. Attacker’s Model
max
VA
[
(1− Γ)oA,D + ΓoA,T] (34)
∆pb ≤ ∆lpb ≤ ∆
p
b, ∀b ∈ BU (35)
∆qb ≤ ∆lqb ≤ ∆
q
b, ∀b ∈ BU (36)
VA = {∆lpb,∆lqb : free}. (37)
Eq. (34) is the objective function of the attacker that
jointly accounts for the adversary effects in the distribution
(oA,D) and transmission (oA,T) grids. Parameter Γ ∈ [0, 1]
is used by the attacker to vary the severity of adversary
impacts between the transmission and distribution grids. If
Γ = 0, the attacker intends to affect the distribution grid
only, whereas Γ = 1 indicates the intention to affect the
transmission grid only. Eq. (35)-(36) define the technical
limits on the ability of the attacker to modify net active
and reactive power injections of IoT-controlled loads, ∆lpb
and ∆lqb, located in the distribution grid. Eq. (37) declares
decision variables of the attacker.
Functions oA,D and oA,T can be formulated in multiple
ways depending on the intentions of the attacker. In this
paper, we assume that the only intention of the attacker is
to cause line overload in the transmission and distribution
grids by changing net power injections of IoT-controlled
loads, ∆lpb and ∆l
q
b, located in the distribution grid. The
impact of ∆lpb and ∆l
q
b on power flows in a tree-structured
distribution lines, can be computed as:
∆f pl =
∑
b∈BD, ↓
r(l)
∆lpb, ∀l ∈ LD (38)
∆f ql =
∑
b∈BD, ↓
r(l)
∆lqb, ∀l ∈ LD. (39)
Eq. (38)-(39) compute the change in active and reactive
power flows caused by altering IoT-controlled loads at the
buses that are located downstream from the receiving bus
of line l (r(l)). Since the dc power flow approximation is
assumed for the transmission grid, only the active power
flows will be affected by the attacker:
∆f pl =
{∑
b∈B+ ω
T
lb
∑
b∈BD ∆l
p
b, if ω
T
lb > 0,∀l ∈ LT
−∑b∈B+ ωTlb∑b∈BD ∆lpb, if ωTlb < 0,∀l ∈ LT
(40)
Eq. (40) computes the active power flow change in trans-
mission lines caused by ∆lpb based on power transfer
distribution factors ωlb. Using Eq. (38)-(40), functions oA,U
and oA,T can be defined as follows:
oA,D =
∑
l∈LD
(∆f pl )
2 + (∆f ql )
2 (41)
oA,T =
∑
l∈LT
(∆f pl )
2 (42)
IV. GRID UNDER THE ATTACK
Given the attack described in eq. (34)-(37), parameters
Dpb and D
q
b are attain the following values:
Dpb → Dpb + ∆lpb (43)
Dqb → Dqb + ∆lqb (44)
Using eq. (43)-(44), the post-attack values of power flows in
the distribution and transmission grids can be obtained from
the DSO-TSO model in eq. (30)-(33). This can be achieved
if the model of the attacker and the coordinated DSO-TSO
model are co-optimized. To enable this co-optimization,
the duality based approach [10] is used to equivalently
recast the bilevel DSO-TSO model in eq. (30)-(33) as the
following single-level problem:
max
VD∪VT∪VTD
oD (45)
D(VD) ≤ 0 (46)
T (VT) ≤ 0 (47)
T TD(VTD) ≤ 0 (48)
oT = oTD, (49)
where eq. (46)-(47) list the primal constraints of the dis-
tribution and transmission grid models, T TD(·) in eq. (49)
denotes the dual constraints of the transmission grid model
and eq. (49) enforces the strong duality condition by
equating the primal (oT) and dual (oT) objective functions
of the transmission grid model. Note that oD in eq. (45)
contains the bilinear product λb0(p
O
b0
− pBb0), which can be
be equivalently replaced using complementarity slackness
conditions of the transmission grid model with the follow-
ing linear expression:
λb0(p
O
b0 − pBb0) = COb pOb − ψbP
O
b + ψbP
B
b − CBb pBb . (50)
The linearized single-level equivalent of the DSO-TSO
model in eq. (30)-(33) and the model of the attacker in
eq. (34)-(37) constitute an equlibrium problem that can be
solved using off-the-shelf solution technique. This descrip-
tion is omitted in this paper due to the pagination limit.
V. CASE STUDY
This case study uses the modified version of the 3-area
IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) [12] for the transmis-
sion grid and the modified version of the IEEE 13-bus test
feeder [11] for the distribution grid. The transmission grid
includes 96 conventional generators, 51 load buses, 120
transmission lines, and 19 wind farms. The total demand in
the transmission grid is 8.9 GW and the total wind power
output is set to 890 MW (10% of the total demand). The
transmission line ratings are reduced to 80% of the original
values to create congestion. The root bus of the distribution
grid is connected to the transmission grid at bus #102 of
the 3-area IEEE Reliability Test System. The distribution
grid supplies the total active power demand of 36 MW and
is populated with three 5 MW gas-fired generators with
the incremental fuel cost of $ 10/MWh, as displayed in
Fig. 2. The power factor at each bus is kept at 0.9. The
root bus of the distribution grid has an infinite supply of
reactive power. The distribution line flow limits are adjusted
to accommodate the apparent power flow to serve the active
and reactive power demand at each bus with a 10% margin.
Fig. 2: A schematic representation of the IEEE 13-bus test feeder
[11]. The total demand of 36 MW is equally distributed between
buses #2-5,-9, 11-12. Gas-fired generators with the maximum
capacity of 5 MW are installed at buses #1,6,10. The circuit
breakers at branches #2-3, 7-8 and 8-9 are closed during normal
operations.
It is assumed that the circuit breakers at both ends of each
branch are set to automatically open if the apparent flow
in that branch exceeds the rated value by 20%. Thus, the
power flow limit at branch 0-3 is 31.5 MVA and the circuit
breaker at the root bus closes at the apparent flow equal
to 34.4 MVA. Finally, we assume that the attacker can
modify the power output of IoT-controlled loads in their
full operating range.
To evaluate the socio-economic damage caused by the
attacker we measure the energy not served, i.e. interrupted
power supply (does not include line losses), and the cost it
incurs defined as the product of the energy not served and
the value of lost load. The value of lost load (VOLL) is set
to $10000/MW [13].
All simulations are carried out using Julia [14] on a 2.9
GHz Intel Core i5 processor with 8GB of RAM.
A. Normal operations
During normal operations, three gas-fired generators
G1-G3 output 5 MW each and the rest of the active power
demand (36−3×5=21 MW) and active power line losses
(1.3 MW) are consumed from the transmission grid leading
to the apparent power flow in branch 0-3 of 28.7 MVA.
B. Attack on the distribution grid
If the attacker intends to limit the scope of the attack
to the distribution grid, it derives the attacks strategy for
Γ = 0. Given the tree structure of the distribution grid, the
attacker would aim to disconnect the distribution grid from
the transmission grid, i.e. to open the circuit breaker at the
root bus, and/or to isolate gas-fired generators by opening
circuit breakers at branches 2-3, 7-8, 8-9.
The attacker can design two strategies:
i) Naive strategy: In this case the attacker is not aware
of the settings on each circuit breaker and, there-
fore, cannot factor in the possibility of downstream
disconnections that may in fact reduce the apparent
power flow in branch 0-3.
ii) Insidious strategy: The attacker accounts for the
effect of downstream disconnections by enforcing
limits on ∆f pl and ∆f
q
l to avoid opening circuit
breakers on branches 2-3, 7-8, 8-9, while maxi-
mizing the flow in branch 0-3.
Table I summarizes the socio-economic impacts of the
naive and insidious attack strategies for different penetration
levels1 of IoT-controlled loads. As the penetration level
remains low, the attacker has no effect on the distribution
grid regardless of the attack strategy chosen. However,
as the penetration level increases, both the energy not
served and its cost gradually increases. This trend indicates
the need to develop a protection mechanism against such
attacks for future grid operations that are likely to host
more IoT-controlled loads. Furthermore, it is noteworthy the
naive strategy leads to lower socio-economic impacts. This
observation can be explained by the fact that downstream
disconnections on branches 2-3, 7-8, 8-9 isolate some of
the attacked IoT-controlled loads that reduces the flow in
branch 0-3 and makes it more challenging for the attacker
to open the circuit breaker at the root bus. The attacker
1The penetration level is defined as the ratio between the power of
IoT-controlled loads at every bus to the total power demand at that bus.
TABLE I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE DISTRIBUTION GRID
MEASURED IN TERMS OF THE ENERGY NOT SERVED (ENS, MW)
AND ITS COST (CENS , $)
Strategy
Penetration level of IoT-controlled loads
10% 25% 50%
ENS CENS ENS CENS ENS CENS
Naive 0 0 6.3 63,411 9.1 90,623
Insidious 0 0 7.9 79,861 21.0 213,411
Fig. 3: Comparison of pre- and post-attack security margins on
transmission lines connected to bus #102.
succeeds to open the circuit breaker at the root bus and
disconnect the transmission and distribution grids only
under the insidious strategy with the 50% penetration level
of IoT-controlled loads. Note that in the latter case three
gas-fired generators located in the distribution grid cover
15 MW of the total demand.
C. Attack on the transmission grid
This attack strategy is derived for Γ = 1. In this case
the attacker aims to cause damage to the transmission grid
only and uses the distribution grid as a proxy. This attack is
possible, if the attacker avoids opening the circuit breaker at
the root bus of the distribution grid. Therefore, the attacker
uses insidious strategy strategy from Section V-B amended
with the setting of the circuit breaker at the root bus.
Under the 10% and 25% penetration levels of the IoT-
controlled loads in the distribution grid, the attacker has
insignificant impacts on the transmission grid operations.
However, as the penetration level increases to 50%, the
attacker seriously reduces security margins2 on transmission
lines connected to bus #102, as shown in Fig. 3. Reduced
security margins do not cause socio-economic impact per
se but may trigger or contribute to line failures that in turn
may cause cascading failures [15].
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has described a modeling framework for
analyzing the grid impacts of distributed attacks on IoT-
controlled loads. The proposed model of grid operations
accounts for both the transmission and distribution grid
operations and makes it possible to analyze a propagation
mechanism of such attacks in a bottom-up manner. The case
study has demonstrated that the socio-economic impacts of
such attacks on the distribution grid depends on the ability
of the attacker to account for the effect of circuit breakers.
Thus, the naive attack strategy without considering the
effect of circuit breakers is shown to be less harmful than
the insidious attack strategy. The ability of the attacker to
noticeably affect transmission grid operations depends on
a penetration level of IoT-controlled loads.
2The security margin (SMl) for line l is defined as SMl = F l−|fpl |.
The paper paves the way for several enhancements that
will constitute our future work. The proposed modeling
framework needs to be extended to account for the multi-
period dynamics of power system operations and recourse
actions under attack. This extension will make it possible
to realistically evaluate the ability of the distribution and
transmission grid to withstand such attacks via post-attack
corrective actions and in presence of operational uncertain-
ties, [16]. Next, the attack propagation needs to be assessed
in a probabilistic framework. Specifically, the likelihood
of cascade failures in the transmission network needs to
be evaluated. From the perspective of the attacker, it is
important to improve the modeling accuracy of individual
IoT-controlled loads. In order to model the attack closer to
a realistic environment, our future work will explore how
publicly available grid sources can be used by the attacker
to design more harmful attack strategies.
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